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THE UNWARRANTED TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CREATORS OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS AND LITERARY,
MUSICAL, OR ARTISTIC COMPOSITIONS OR
SIMILAR PROPERTIES*
The present system of Federal income taxation unwarrantedly
discriminates against creators of copyrighted works and literary,
musical or artistic compositions or similar properties.' Although
Congress2 under authority of the Constitution,3 guarantees the author
of a copyrighted work an exclusive right to his work, such a guar-
antee is of little value if the proceeds from that exclusive right are
to be taxed out of his bands immediately upon receipt. Authors often
spend long periods working on a project during which they receive
no income therefrom. Then, if they are fortunate enough to produce
a successful work which yields returns, they often find that the com-
pensation is "bunched" in one year. Under the present sharply
graduated personal income tax rates, their net remuneration after
taxes is much less than that of the ordinary taxpayer who earns the
same amount in a comparable period of time.
Recognizing this inequality and attempting to alleviate it, Con-
gress has enacted so-called "spread-back" provisions in our tax
system. However, as applied to authors as a class, these provisions
are so restrictive as to be of little benefit. Even under the spread-back
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there is unwarranted
discrimination against the author.
Capital gains treatment, which is afforded the inventor of a
patented product, is a possible alleviation of this inequality due to
bunched income. However, Congress has seen fit to categorically
exclude authors from possible capital gains treatment because their
compensation from the disposition of a copyright is remuneration
from personal efforts. In view of the expressed policy of Congress
to eliminate 'loopholes" in our tax system whereby the products
of personal efforts are afforded capital gains treatment, such treat-
ment may not be the theoretically perfect solution to the presently
adverse tax treatment of authors. However, it is believed that so
long as capital gains treatment is not denied the products of personal
0 This note has been submitted as a contribution to the Twenty-first Annual
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers.
'. In this note, to prevent needless repetition, the word "copyright" will gen-
erally be used when the group consisting of copyrights, literary, musical, or
artistic compositions or similar properties is referred to. Also, "authors" will be
used in the generic sense to describe all creators of copyrightable works.217 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
a U.S. Const. Art I, § 8.
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efforts in a multiplicity of other instances, authors should not be
expressly and categorically denied the possibility of such treatment
It appears, however, that authors themselves are to a large degree
responsible for their own adverse tax treatment. It is submitted
that if these masters of the pen would show a little ingenuity and
aggressiveness in regard to the tax treatment presently afforded them
they could at least partially improve their present position.
Copyrights and Capital Gains Taxation
Capital gains treatment of compensation from copyrights is cate-
gorically denied both professional and amateur authors specifically
by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 Such treatment is in line
with the generally expressed intent of Congress to prevent taxpayers
from reporting compensation from personal efforts as capital gains.5
However, in many instapces Congress and the courts have extended
capital gains treatment to income from personal efforts, either by
express affirmative action or by negative inference.;
4 Int. Rev. Code, § 1221. Capital Asset Defined. For the purposes of this
subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business;(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167,
or real property used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition or similar
property held by-
(a) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property, or
(b) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is de-
termined, for the purpose of determining gains from a sale
or exchange, in whole or in part by reference to the basis
of such property in the hands of the person whose personal
efforts created such property;(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of
trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of prop-
erty described in paragraph (1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or its possessions, or of a state
or territory, or any political subdivision thereof or of the District
of Columbia, issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis
and payable without interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding
one year from the date of issue. [Emphasis added.]
5 It is certainly understandable why authors seek to come within the capital
gains tax structure since under it their tax rate is limited to twenty-five per cent
rather than the sharply graduated ordinary income rates which rise to ninety-
one per cent.6 Although no comprehensive official statement of the congressional pur-
poses of permitting capital gains treatment can be found see Miller, "Capital
Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Efforts: Before and Under the 1954
Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 6-7, n. 24 (1954) in which he states:
The most important single statement [as to the congressional purposes
in permitting capital gains treatment] appears in the 1921 Report of the
Ways and Means Committee advocating favored treatment for capital
[Vol. 47,
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Congress has approved this extention in some instances by express
declaration of the "incentive" motive7 or relief from "unduly harsh"
taxation,8 while condemning it in other instances as a 'loop-hole." 9
Similarly the federal courts have repeatedly reached inconsistent
holdings in similar cases as to capital asset treatment of the gains from
personal efforts.'0
The question presented here is why have authors been expressly
singled out for adverse tax treatment while similar taxpayers whose
compensation is also the result of personal efforts are often not denied
the more favorable capital gains treatment. Why have their efforts
to come within the capital gains category been singled out as a tax
"loophole"" to be completely closed by action directed specifically
at them?
Before 1950, although a professional author could not get capital
gains treatment upon the disposition of his copyright, 12 an amateur
author could obtain such treatment provided his disposition met the
requirements of a "sale or exchange" and was not a mere 'license."' 3
gains on the ground that 'the sale of farms, mineral properties and
other capital assets is now seriously retarded by the fact that gains
and pro ts earned over a series of years are ...taxed in a lump sum
...in the year in which the profit is realized. Many such sales with
their possible profit taking, and consequent increase in the tax revenue,
have been blocked by this feature of the present law. H.R. Rep. No.
350, 67th Cong. 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).'
See also Miller," The Capital Asset Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Tax-
ation: II, 59 Yale L.J. 1057 (1950).
However. since 1942, Congressional enactments have not harmonized
with the theory that the purpose ofcapital gains treatment is to mitigate the
impact of graduated rates on profits arising over several years. For such instance,
see Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation on the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before
and Under the 1954 Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 9-10, 82, nn. 526, 527 (1954), and
the immediately succeeing sentence and accompanying footnotes of this note.
7 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1950) (employee's restricted
stock options); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954) (Sale of
patents).
8S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951) (lump-sum payments
to employee upon termination of employment in lieu of contingent deferred
compensation).
S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950) (capital gains for
writers).
10 For example, see Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Per-
sonal Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 82, n. 529, ac-
companying text, and materials referred to (1954).
11H.R. Rep. No. 2319. 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950); Sen. Rep. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess, 43 (1950).1 2 This distinction between amateurs and professionals was based on the
test of a "sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (a) (1) (A) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221 (1).
13 Although true, this statement is a gross over-simplification. Note that a
tremendous amount of litigation in regard to what constituted a "sale or ex-
change" of a copyright or a patent (copyrights and patents are lumped together
as they were treated substantially the same prior to 1950) resulted when less
than all the rights thereto were transferred or when the selling price was con-
tingent upon the -future productivity, use, or disposition of the property. Also
19591
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However, the Revenue Act of 1950 amended the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 to exclude from the definition of capital assets a copy-
right, a literary, musical, or artistic composition or similar property
held by a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property
or by someone whose basis was determined by reference to the
creator's basis.14
Such singling out for adverse tax treatment was largely attributable
to congressional disapproval of certain highly publicized transac-
tions involving property of this nature. The most famous of which
was. the sale of Crusade in Europe by now President Eisenhower
for a reported $1,000,000, all of which, under a ruling of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, was taxed only as a capital gain.15 Consequently
due to a few highly publicized instances like this where large sums
of money were involved, Congress was motivated to categorically
exclude all amateur authors from capital gains treatment while all
other amateurs were left free to seek such treatment.
The House and Senate committee reports portrayed allowing
amateur authors to get capital gain treatment as a "loophole" because
such a taxpayer received long-term capital gains treatment on "the
products of his personal efforts."16 Ostensibly this statement shows
congressional disapproval of capital gain treatment of any products
of personal- effort. However, in addition to the many instances in
which such "disfavor" was not crystalized into effective Congres-
sional enactments, this inference is refuted by the congressional com-
mittee reports themselves. Such is true for, in elucidating on the
statutory exclusion of "similar property" from section 1221 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the reports state:
The interest of a sole proprietor in such a business enterprise as a
photographic studio is not 'similar property' even though the value
the problem of whether the disposition constituted a sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business, i.e. whether the creator of the copyright or inventor
was an amateur or professional, resulted in much litigation. See Grittin and
Woodward, "Tax Aspects of Patents, Copyrights and Trade-Marks," Current
Problems in Federal Taxation 17-29 (Practising Law Institute 1953); Pilpel,
"Tax Aspects of Copyright Property", 1953 Copyright Problems Analyzed 177,
181-88 (1953); Pilpel, "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in
1954), 83 Taxes 271, 273 (1955); 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1420 nn. 15, 16
(1954); 20 Mo. L. Rev. 187, 192-195 (1955).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 117(a) (1) (C), added by ch. 994, 64 Stat. 932
(1950) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(3).
15 The Bureau's ruling that the proceeds of the sale were taxable at capital
gains rates rather than at personal income rates saved Eisenhower approximately
$500,000 in tax, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1948, p. 31, col. 5. See also Herwig v.
United States, 105 supp. 884 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (Sale of motion picture rights to
Forever Amber by Kathleen Windsor taxable only as a capital gain).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
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of the business may be largely attributable to the personal efforts
of the sole proprietor.' 7
Thus the proceeds from the sale of the good will of a business
have been allowed to fall within the capital gain classification, even
though in fact such value is largely attributable to the personal
efforts of the taxpayer while engaged in his trade or business.' 8
Relying on the basis for the increase in value, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish this realized increase in value called good-
will from the proceeds of the sale of a copyright, even though the
author thereof may in fact be a professional. Such tax treatment
of the sale of the good will of a business should be compared with
Stern v. United States.19 In that case it was held that the sale, not
of a book or any tangible property, but of the taxpayer's "right, title
and interest... in and to ... that certain character known as 'Francis'
[the famous talking Army mule of World War II] conceived and
created by" the taxpayer, despite its similarity to the good will of a
business, constituted the sale of a literary composition resulting
in ordinary income rather than capital gain.20
An example of express congressional allowance of capital gains
treatment for the proceeds of personal efforts is the restricted stock
option of section 421 of the 1954 Code. When the restrictions of
this provision are met, an employee who exercises an option to pur-
chase stock of his corporate employer is allowed capital gain upon
the sale of the stock.21
Capital gain benefits are not denied to a home-owner selling his
residence at a profit even though his own work and efforts so im-
proved the property so as to lead to the gain. If an architect or grocer,
on the side, builds his own house or boat and sells it after six months,
the transaction is treated as the sale of a capital asset. If an amateur
author goes through the throes of writing something, why should
he be treated worse for tax purposes than the architect or grocer who
has built his own house or boat and later sells it? Why should the
amateur author be treated differently than all other amateurs?
'7H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1950); See Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits
of Personal Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 8-9 (1954).
18See also Aaron Michaels 12 T.C. 17 (1949); Treasury Department In-
ternal Revenue Service Publication No. 334, Tax Guide for Small Business
118 (1959).
Possibly the capital gains treatment of good will can be justified on the
practical difficulty of separating the personal effort element from the other in-
tangibles sold as a part of a going business and the investment factor involved
therein. See Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort:
Before and Under the 1954 Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 30 (1954).
'9 164 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. La. 1958).
20 Id. at 848.
21 See Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort:
Before and Under the 1954 Code," 64 Yale L.J. 1, 6, 50 (1954).
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In many close corporations the stock of which is sold as a capital
asset, it is a practical fact that the taxpayer selling the stock of such
close corporation, be he the original founder or the manager of the
corporation, has enhanced the value of the asset no differently than
an author creates a copyrightable work. Thus, capital gains treat-
ment may be available to the products of the personal endeavors of
the stockholder, even though such products were created in his trade
or business, while denied to the professional as well as the amateur
author.
Section 1281 of the Internal Code of 1954 extends capital gains
treatment to gain from the sale of property used in the taxpayer's
trade or business which is subject to allowance for depreciation under
section 167 and which has been held for more than six months22
except, logically, inventory and property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business and
except, illogically, copyrights. With these exceptions, section 1231
does not differentiate between property that is acquired by pur-
chase as against property used in trade or business that is produced
by the taxpayer himself. However, Congress saw fit to expressly
exclude copyrights and similar property from the benefit of 1231.23
Thus, other taxpayers under section 1231 can transfer property largely
attributable to their personal efforts to their trade or business and
by reason of the use of the property for a time in their trade or
business obtain capital gains treatment. This "loop-hole" is closed
only to authors and is specifically closed to them. The capital gain
benefit of 1231, denied both amateur and professional authors, is
not denied a taxpayer such as a professional builder who constructs a
building for rental purposes and, after renting such property for the
required length of time, sells the rented property and enjoys capital
gain thereon, even though his personal efforts may have largely been
responsible for the creation of the building in question.
Perhaps even more illustrative of the dichotomic tax treatment
2 2 Section 1231 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, just as did its earlier counter-
part under the 1939 Code, gives relief from a former rule that gains from the
sale of exchange of depreciable property used in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness were ordinary income as suchproperty was not, and is not, included within
the definition of capital assets under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221, or its
1939 counterpart. Under § 1231, known as the "taxpayer's friend," if gains from
the sale of such property exceed losses from the sale of such property and the
property was held more than six months, the gain may be treated as a capital
gain. On the other hand if the losses under this Janus-faced island in the sea of
harsh taxation exceed the gains, the losses are not treated losses from the sale
or exchange of capital assets, but are considered ordinary losses.
23 "Your Committee has found it necessary to make a clarifying amendment
to Section 117 (j) of the (1939) code to prevent the creator of such prop-
erty [copyrights] from obtaining capital gains treatment by reason of the use of
such property for a time in his trade or business." S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 84 (1950).
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given professional authors compared with persons engaged in other
trades or businesses are the timber24 and unharvested crop 25 sit-
uations in which, under section 1281, taxpayers are entitled to capital
gain treatment even though they produced these products on their
own lands for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
Consequently, not only have amateur authors been categorically
singled out for adverse tax treatment by denying them the possi-
bility of capital gains consideration which is denied no other class
of amateurs, but also, professional authors are denied the possi-
bility of capital gains treatment which is not denied many other tax-
payers on the products of their personal efforts created in their
trade or business.
However, by far the most evident example of the discrimination
in tax treatment given copyrights compared with other products of
personal effort is the favorable tax treatment given patents. Before
1950 capital gains taxation treatment was available to amateur in-
ventors and authors, but not to professionals. However, the Rev-
enue Act of 1950, which excluded copyrights, literary, musical or
artistic composition or similar property held by the creator of such
property or by someone whose basis was determined by reference
to the creator's basis, did not apply to patents. Thus, from 1950-
1954, all authors and professional inventors were denied capital gain
treatment although it remained available to amateur inventors. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, while still excluding all copyrights
and similar property, by section 1235 affirmatively extended the scope
of capital gain treatment to professional as well as amateur invent-
ors.26 Further, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 left open the pos-
sibility of capital gain treatment on the sale of patents which do not
qualify under section 1235.27
Therefore, under the existing code all authors' will be denied
capital gain treatment on the transfer of copyrights while inventors
usually will be able to get capital gains treatment. This analogy
2 4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b)(2).25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b) (4). Many of these instances in which
taxpayers get capital gains treatment on the products of personal efforts have been
pointed out to Congress by patent interests while waging their war on ordinary
income taxation. See for example, Hearing on H. R. 8920 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 678-79 (1950).
26 For this history see Pilpel, "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copy-
rights in 1954," 33 Taxes 271-272 (1955) and Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419,
1420-21 (1954).
27See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954); Leonard Coplan,
28 T.C. 1189, 1192 (1957); MacCracken, "Method by Which Inventor, Investor,
and Others May Obtain Capital Gain Treatment of Income Derived from Patents,"
10th U. So. Cal. Tax Inst. 645, 659-60 (1958). Clark, "Tax Aspects of Oper-
ating Patents: Income From a License Agreement as Capital Gain or Ordinary
Income," Patent Licensing 91, 113 (Practising Law Institute 1958); Pavitts,
"Patents Under Code Section 1235," 33 Taxes 265, 270 (1955).
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is drawn to show that Congress has intentionally granted capital gain
treatment to products created in substantially the same manner as
copyrights, i.e. largely through the personal efforts of taxpayers.
Here we have two almost identically created products being given
entirely different tax treatment. This demonstrates that it would not
be impossible nor too bizarre for the professional as well as the
amateur author to be afforded capital gains treatment by affirmative
approval of Congress.
However, authors can contest the unfavorable tax treatment given
them Without having to rely upon the tax treatment given inventors.
This writer, unlike many other commentators on this subject,28
believes that adequate reasons exist to warrant the favorable tax
treatment afforded inVentors compared with perhaps all other tax-
payers. -It is submitted that there are adequate grounds to justify
Congress' granting favorable tax treatment "to provide a larger in-
centive to all inventors to contribute to the welfare of the nation,"
e.g. for defense and progress in general. 29
However, to this view authors can legitimately retort, as did
Harriet F. Pilpel in "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights
in 1954:" 30
2sPilpel, "Tax Aspects of Copyright Property" 1953 Copyright Problems
Analyzed (1958); Pilpel "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in
1954," 38 Taxes 271 (1955); Pilpel, "Tax Law Affecting Copyrights: 1954-1956,
35 Taxes 76 (1957; Note. 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1957).
29 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
See also S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950) where the
Senate Finance Commttee refused to follow the House in barring all in-
ventors from capital gains treatment explaining:
[T]he desirability of fostering the work of such inventors outweighs
the small amount of additional revenue which might be obtained
under the House bill....
Thus inventors have apparently convinced Congress that the yield to be obtained
from. taxation of the disposition of a patent is small indeed compared to the
possible ultimate cost to the nation which might result from the discouragement
of invention by the enactment of unfavorable legislation regarding patents. See
also Hearings on H. R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 601-08, 678-79, 680-81 (1950); Hearings on H. R. 8300 Before
the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 3, 4, at 1662-69, 1684-
91, 1860-74 (1954). See also Kitchen, "Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income-Com-
parative Federal Income Taxation," in Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income, Ind.
St. Bar Assn. 1, 35 (1958).
Other reasons may also justify a distinction between the tax treatment
given authors and inventors for as a general matter the creation of inventions
takes longer than the creation of copyrights and a copyright lasts longer (28
years with a renewal option) than a patent (17 years). Furthermore, it often
takes much longer after the project is completed to get a patent than to get
a copyright. See Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1425 (1957). Also in taxing the
transfer of patents, if this actually retards the production of inventions, the
Treasury may be "cutting off its nose to spite its face' as inventions often lead
to whole new industries requiring great resources, e.g. labor and capital,
resulting in vast new sources of taxation.
3033 Taxes 271, 276 (1955).
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Apparently, our Senators and Representatives, in their anxiety to
foster the development of offensive and defensive weapons in this
age of the atom, have forgotten that much of invention is based
on the knowledge contained in writings which are the subject of
copyright rather than patent.
Also as noted in 70 Harvard Law Review 1419, at 1424 (1957):
The present favorable treatment of patents seems defensible only
if the activity of inventors is materially affected by tax consider-
ations.... In the absence of a showing that such preferential treat-
ment materially encourages invention, . . . discriminatory taxation
should be avoided.
The Harvard note, after interpreting a graph presented by patent
interests before Congress in 1953 to show that fluctuation in the num-
ber of patent applications by individuals between 1900 and 1950
were affected by tax rates,al concluded that fluctuations in inventive
output show no correlation to changes in the tax structure and are
probably more closely related to general economic conditions and
international events. If such be true, then the discrepancy between
tax treatment given authors and inventors is unwarranted.
However, the possibility of benefit to the nation warrants the
present tax treatment afforded inventors. Authors should and can
stand on their own two feet and contest the unfair tax treatment
given to them without riding on the coattails of the favorable tax
treatment Congress has afforded inventors in the exercise of a far-
reaching policy decision.
The preceding examples whereby the products of personal efforts
receive capital gain treatment are merely illustrative and are by no
means exclusive. 2 Thus, it should now be quite apparent that under
existing law, professional, and to an even greater degree amateur,
authors are unjustifiably discriminated against by denial to them of
the possibility of capital gain treatment.
In view of the fact that earnings from the sale of literary property
is considered income from personal service when the amateur seeks
capital gains treatment, it is most surprising to note that when it
comes to the benefits which such income would otherwise enjoy
under that classification, such benefits may not be available. For
example, in some instances earned income is considered "retirement
income" and retirement income up to a certain amount and subject
Si Hearings on a General Revenue Revision Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1189-91 (1953).
3 2 For some other instances in which the products of personal efforts re-
ceive the benefits of capital gains rates see Miller, "Capital Gains Taxation of




to certain restrictions is exempt from taxation. As noted by Harriet
F. Pilpel in "Tax Law Affecting Copyrights 1954-1956," 35 Taxes, 76, 77
(1957), "When it comes to such advantages of so-called earned in-
come, literary property is again ruled out and for the purposes of
retirement income, literary property - like the pumpkin-coach in
Cinderella - turns back into a capital asset." Such is true for under
a ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue:
Where . . . royalties are derived from the sale, leasing or renting
of a book, they are not paid for personal services actually rendered
but are paid for the use or sale of property and do not come within
the meaning of the term 'earned income' as used in section 37(d) (2)
of the Code.83
Thus, not only are authors denied capital gains treatment but they
are also denied even the benefits of the favorable earned income-tax
treatment.
To reiterate, so long as many other products of personal efforts
are left open for possible capital gains treatment, copyrights should
not be singled out for specific categorical exclusion from the capital
gains classification. Much less should a double standard be applied
to them adversely so that they are given earned income tax treat-
ment in one case and capital gains treatment in another-whichever
will be most adverse to them.
Nevertheless, this writer would not criticize too severely the
non-application of the capital gains category to authors if spread-
back provisions of the Code adequately protected authors. But, as
will be shown shortly, the spread-back provisions of the Code are
entirely inadequate to afford fair treatment to authors.
CoPYGHrs AND SPREAD-BACK PROVISIONS OF TBE
INTERNAL E ENuE CODE
Recognizing the inequality whereby an author often receives
compensation in a single year which is attributable in whole or in
part to work done over a period of years, Congress enacted the
spread-back provisions whereby an author may spread back the in-
come over a previous period,34 provided certain highly stringent re-
quirements under section 1302 are met. First, the work on the copy-
righted product must have covered a period of at least twenty-four
months from the beginning to completion. Second, in the taxable
year the gross income from the copyright must not be less than eighty
per cent of the total of the gross income received therefrom in the
following periods:
331Bev. Rul. 55-636, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 17, 18. However see this ruling
for an exception.34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1302.
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(1) the taxable year
(2) all previous taxable years, and
(8) the twelve months immediately succeeding the close of the
taxable year.
If the above requirements under section 1302 are met, the tax on the
income from the copyright for the year to which section 1302 applies
cannot be greater than the total income taxes which would have been
due if the income had been received ratably over whichever of the
following periods is the shorter:
(1) the period from the beginning of the work to the close of the
taxable year; or
(2) thirty-six months85
For reasons to be discussed later, as a practical matter, section 1802
has been of little benefit to the majority of taxpayers.
Moreover, even if the author qualifies to come within the spread-
back provisions of section 1302, he is discriminated against as com-
pared to the spread back provisions granted similar taxpayers. In-
ventors may spread back the income over a period up to sixty months.
Whereas an author is permitted to spread back only thirty-six months,
an individual who has rendered personal services, such as a lawyer
or doctor can, under Internal Revenue Code 1954, section 1301,
spread back the compensation over the actual period of time con-
sumed. Furthermore, the taxpayer qualifying under section 1301,
unlike the author, in computing the eighty per cent, need take into
account only all the years preceding the year in which the eighty
per cent must be received and need not consider the succeeding year.
Section 1304 of the 1954 Code permits compensatory damages
awarded in a civil action for patent infringement to be treated as if
received ratably over the months during which the infringement ac-
tually occurred. Although there is no provision applying to copy-
rights similar to that of section 1304, inferentially leaving such dam-
ages to be reported as income for the year in which they are awarded,
the problems arising from the infringement of patents and copy-
rights are similar. Consequently, a provision similar to section 1804
should be made available to copyright infringements.
However, ignoring the discrepancies of the spread-back provisions
as applied to copyrights compared with their application to similar
projects created over a period of years, section 1302 as a practical
matter does not aid authors as a class to any great extent. Under the
holding of the Supreme Court in Robertson v. United States,36 an
35 Tres. Reg. § 1.1302-1 (c) (1958); Comment, 20 Mo. L. Rev. 187, 196-
98 (1955).
36 343 U.S. 711 (1952). The Court held that even though the taxpayer had
composed a symphony during the period of 1936-39 the compensation could not
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author is required to spread back the compensation over a period
immediately preceding the close of the taxable year of receipt rather
than over the period of actual work. Thus, as is often the case, where
an author has been working and consistently turning out work over a
period of years he finds that when a number of his works created
over such periods are sold within a single year or within a short
period of time his income is bunched within a relatively brief portion
of time despite the application of section 1302.37
Further, few authors can meet the stringent eighty per cent
requirement as few receive eighty per cent of their income from one
work in a single year. As a practical matter an author may sell a
copyrightable work as a magazine serial in one year, as a book in
a second year, and for a movie in a third year and in each of these
years receive less than the specified eighty per cent of the total in-
come he earns from the book,38 thereby never qualifying under sec-
tion 1302.
In selling or licensing the use of copyrights, authors should so
draft their contracts as to come within the eighty per cent requirement
of section 1302. Much can be accomplished by this method; however,
the taxpayer remains vulnerable to a contention of the Commissioner
that the contract is a mere invalid subterfuge to avoid taxes.3 9
be spread over that period but only over the allowable period immediately
preceding the close of the taxable year of receipt, i.e. 1947.
37 Such is not an unusual situation for, in addition to this happening due
to fortuitous circumstances, often an unknown author labors for years without
selling many of his products, only to find that once he creates a book that
"catches on' and which creates a name for him and a market for past works
the compensation for efforts over a considerable number of years is taxed
over the thirty-six months immediately preceding the close of the taxable year
in which the compensation is received.
38 Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d
Cong.. 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1613 (1954).39 An alleviation of the income-tax problem is the device of spreading n
come forward. Thus if an author, instead of making an outright sale his
copyrights works for a flat sum, contracts to receive royalties he will be taxed
only on the amounts received within the year. However, as this may still cause
income from the project to be bunched, authors often put a ceiling on the annual
royalty they may receive within the year. Mr. Joseph F. Gelband in "How to
Spread an Author's Income Back as Well as Forward: A Specimen Contract" in
10 The Journal of Taxation 105 (Feb. 1959) presents a contract calculated to
take advantage of not only the possibility of spreading income forward but
also of spreading it backward to take advantage of section 1302. However, such
spread forward contracts are predicated on the major premises that the contract
will prevail over the possible contention of the Commissioner of constructive
receipt of compensation by the author. However, the case of Oates v. Common-
wealth, 207 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), provides some assurance to authors
who contract to be paid only a certain amount per year of the royalty contract.
In this case, under an insurance company's contract with its agent, the agent
was to receive commissions on renewal premiums after retirement for nine years.
In the normal course of events under this contractural arrangement, he would
have received a large sum the first year after retirement and lesser amounts
during the next eight years as the renewals lessened. The agent who was to
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Thus, not only does the present tax structure categorically bar
authors from the possibility of capital gain treatment of the products
of their endeavors, but the spread-back provision is grossly inadequate
to relieve the inequality of bunched income; i.e., it is often inapplicable
and when applicable often ineffectual to put authors on a par with
other taxpayers.
I However, the capital gains treatment of copyrights, or rather
lack of capital gains treatment, and the inadequacies of the spread-
back provision of 1302 are merely illustrative of the unjustified tax
differentiation against authors by our tax laws and are by no means
exclusive. For example, take the instance where an author of a copy-
right attempts to shift the incidence of tax away from himself to
another party by gift.
The shifting of the incidence of tax is ordinarily sanctioned by the
courts if the proper procedures are taken and no improper subject
matter is involved. However, an author, by making a. gift of a copy-
right, may find himself in the unenviable position of having made a
retire three days later entered into an agreement with the company under which
the value of his future commissions were to be paid him in equal installments
of $1,000.00 per month over the nine years following retirement. A tax defi-
ciency was accessed for the difference between the commissions which were
accrued in the taxable year after retirement and the amounts actually received
by the taxpayer under the second contractural arrangement. The Tax Court
with the 7th Circuit affirming sustained the arrangement, holding that a bona
fide agreement deferring payment due under a prior contract is effective if en-
tered into before the date on which payments were to begin. If this case can
be relied on by authors, it will be of great benefit to them in seeking to limit
the amount of reportable income per year. See Pilpel, "Developments in Tax
Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954," 33 Taxes 271, 274 (1955).
In attempting to spread income forward, authors must give careful
consideration to the specific installment sales provisions of section 453 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under section 453(a) a person who regularly
sells personal property on the installment plan may report as income therefrom
in any taxable year only that proportion of the installments payments actually
received in that year which the gross profit, realized or to be realized when
payment is completed, bears to the contract price. Thus professional authors,
even though having sold their copyrighted work outright for a definite sum, can
take advantage of this provision.
Of benefit to the amateur author is section 453(b) which allows similar
treatment in the case of a casual sale of personal property, other than inventory,
for a price in excess of $1,000.00 if the initial payment does not exceed thirty
per cent of the selling price. When such a provision is complied with no ques-
tion of constructive or anticipatory receipt ofcompensation can be raised. How-
ever, when it is not complied-with the possibility of taxpayer success is practically
nil. 1 P. H. Fed. Taxes para. 6691 (1959). See Pilpel, "Developments in Tax
Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 33 Taxes 271, 275 (1955) noting Rev. Rul.
234, 1953-2 Cu. Bull. 29, obtained by President Truman on the sale of his then
unwritten memoirs under which the sale was held to have favorably fallen
within the 1939 Code counterpart of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453(b).
In utilizing the spread forward provisions, the author taxpayer always
renders himself vulnerable to the possibility of the insolvency of the purchaser
or licensee and also to changes in the tax structure and rates-the former structure
having an inveterate propensity to tighten; and the latter rates, to increase. See S.
Rep. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 85 (1950).
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transfer which is subject to a gift tax but which is nevertheless in-
effective to shift the income tax incidence to the donee. Such it is
feared may be the case where the author of a copyrighted work
makes the gift of his interest in the copyright after he has contracted
to license or sell his work.40 That is what happened in Sax Rohme 41
where it was held that because a sale of serial rights of a copyrighted
work had been made by the taxpayer before he assigned a one-
half interest in the work as a whole to a donee, he had made a tax-
able gift. Nonetheless he was not relieved of the income tax liability
on the total proceeds of the serial rights since this transaction con-
stituted a mere "temporary assignment of income."42 Some hope was
held out to such taxpayers by Commissioner v. Reece 43 wherein it
was held that the inventor's irrevocable gift of a royalty contract
to a patent was effective to shift the incidence of tax away from him-
self. However, the later case of Heim v. Fitzpatrick44 reached a con-
trary result so that it again appears dangerous for an author to at-
tempt to shift the incidence of tax away from himself by gift after
he has negotiated a royalty contract or sale.
Another example of the indefensible discrimination against copy-
rights involves the only parties who may now get capital gain treat-
ment on the disposition of a copyright, i.e., the purchasers of the
copyright, the author's estate4.5 or his heirs. According to the views
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, capital gains treatment even
here is available only if the consideration paid
is not measured by a percentage of the receipts from the sale, per-
formance or publication of the copyrighted work, [or] by the number
of copies sold, performances given, or exhibitions made of the copy-
righted work, and is not payable periodically over a period gen-
erally co-terminus with the grantee's use of the copyrighted work.46
401It had long been conceded that an author could shift the incidence of
tax away from himself by a gratuitous assignment prior to licensing his copyrighted
product, of all or part of his interest in the copyright. Pilpel, "Tax Law Affect-
ing Copyrights: 1954-1956," 85 Taxes 76, 77 (1957).
Also in 1954 the Internal Revenue Service had ruled for the first time
that there could be transferred separately the right to exploit copyright property
in separate media, e.g. motion picture rights, publication rights, dramatic pro-
ductions rights, etc. could be separately transferred away without the author
remaining liable for the income therefrom. Rev. Rul. 54-409, 54-2 Cum. Bull. 174.
4121 T.C. 1099 (1954).
42Sax Rohmer, 14 T. C. 1467 (1950); Pilpel, "Developments in Tax Law
Affecting Copyrights in 1954," 83 Taxes 271, 274 (1955).
43 283 F. 2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956).
44 151 F. Supp. 574 (D.C. Conn. 1957).
45 The fact that an author's estate can get capital gain treatment upon the
disposition of the author's work has caused one writer to ironically comment,
"From the standpoint of taxes alone, the best thing that can happen to an
author is that he should drop dead." Pilpel, "Tax Aspects of Copyright Prop-
erty" 1953 Copyright Problems Analyzed. 177, 190 (1953". n46 Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 174; Pilpe, "Tax Law Affecting
Copyrights: 1954-1956," 35 Taxes 76, 77 (1957).
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Since the effective date of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, patent
owners qualifying under section 1285 have not needed to worry
about the contingent nature of the consideration paid for their product.
Now, even the Commissioner, after taking a severe beating in the
courts,4 7 has ruled that the contingent nature of the consideration
in patent transactions not qualifying under section 1285 will not bar
capital gain treatment48 although he apparently still takes the ob-
stinate view that it will in regard to copyrights.
49
REASONS FoR TiE PmEsENT TAX DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST AuTIoRs
In regard to the unwarranted tax discrimination placed upon the
creators of literary works, perhaps it is unfair to blame Congress
and the courts since the authors themselves are largely responsible
for their present sad plight. Although authors possess the skill and
eloquence necessary for effective advocacy, they have been altogether
too inactive and ineffectual in regard to their own tax treatment.
As one writer has commented, it is like the shoemaker's children
going barefoot, the wielders of words have not used them to per-
suade in this area. 0
A comparison of authors' methods with the vociferous and per-
suasive methods utilized by inventors and patent interests when
proposed or existing tax statutes threatened their interest is not out
of place here. Between 1950 and 1954, while inventors forcefully
presented their views at the congressional hearings preceding re-
visions of the Revenue Code, the authors were largely inactive and
showed little vigor or ingenuity. As passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, the bill which later became the Revenue Act of 1950
prevented both authors and inventors from reporting profits from
the sale of patents and copyrights as capital gain.51 As noted in 70
Harvard Law Review 1419, 1428 (1954), after testimony by inventors
and representatives of patent organizations emphasizing the possible
effect on the nation itself,52 the Senate amended the bill so as not to
exclude capital gain treatment of the sale of a patent by an amateur
47 Clark, "Tax Aspects of Operating Patents: Income from a License Agree-
ment as Capital Gain or Ordinary Income," Patent Licensing 91, 96-97 (Prac-
ising Law Institute 1958).48 Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-29 Cum. Bull. 112.
49 However, just as before the Commissioner reversed his view in patent
cases, the courts may not follow him. See Stem v. United States 164 F. Supp.
847, 850 (E.D. La. 1958).
50Pilpel, "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954," 33
Taxes 271, 276 (1955).
51 See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1950).
52 Hearings on H. R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 601-08, 680-81 (1950).
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inventor.53 In 1954 the patent interests not only held their own against
a "loophole" closing Congress54 but secured such favorable tax legis-
lation, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 1235, as to bring
forth cries of possible distortion of the tax structure.55 On the other
hand, authors were again inactive and ineffective when active at all.56
In 1954 before the Senate Committee on Finance, two representatives
of professional writers submitted statements but both limited their
suggestions to methods of spreading income.57 On the other hand,
more imaginative patent interests in 1950 had eloquently lobbied
for, in addition to the many concessions they succeeded in obtaining,
a 27V per cent depletion allowance similar to that afforded oil in-
terests.58 Of no little significance is the fact that one of these sug-
gestions of the authors' group, to reduce the work period required
for spreading income from thirty-six to twenty-four months, was
adopted in section 1802 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.59
Thus, it is submitted that the present discriminatory taxation of
authors, artists and musicians largely goes back to the old adage,
"If you don't toot your own horn, nobody else will." These tax-
payers must themselves organize and present their case before Con-
53 S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1950).54 As noted in 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1423 n. 35 (1954):
The House bill in 1954 treated the sale of a patent as a capital trans-
action only if the seller retained no rights in the patent and if all pro-
ceeds were received within five years from the date of sale. H.R. 8300
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 1235 (1954); See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A 280 (1954). At the Senate hearings patent interests
attacked the restrictions contained in the House bill as unrealistic and
detrimental to inventors. "Hearing on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance," 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 4, at 1622-69,
1684-91, 1860-74 (1954). Section 1235 as enacted is substantially the
same as the Senate version, which incorporated many of the recom-
mendations made at these hearings. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 438-41 (1954).
55 Note 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1426 (1957).
56 It should be noted that many of these arguments advanced by the patent
interests are equally applicable to copyrights and have been utilized in this note.
See for example Hearings on H. R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
81st Cong. 2d Sess. 678-79 (1950).
However, a factor which should not be overlooked in analyzing the
different tax treatment afforded patents and that afforded a copyright, a literary,
musical or artistic composition or similar property is the ineffable, but underlying,
sense of values of the American people. In the American people's hierarchy of
values, in distinguishing between "instrumentalities and products of progress"
(e.g. inventions) and 'things of value in the narrowly defined cultural sense"
(e.g. a painting) the American people may, unfortunately but factually, give
greater significance to the former. Or, to put it bluntly we as a nation may not
value what authors, artists and musicians have to contribute as much as we value
what inventors have to contribute.
57 Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 83d
Cong. 2d Sess., pts. 1, 3, at 226-28, 1610-14 (1954).
58 Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st
Copg., 2d Sess. 606-08 (1950).
59 See Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1423, n. 35 (1957).
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gress and before the public in such a manner as to take them out of
the least-favored-of-all tax category. As Harriet F. Pilpel has said,
"Unless authors decide to and can make Congress respond to their
tax problem, at least to the extent as inventors have [or at least
to a reasonable degree], they would be well advised to turn their
pens into plow shares and to patent the latter at once."60
Linza B. Inabnit
AGENCY-AUTOMOBILE TORT LIABILITY OF THE MINOR
PRINCIPAL
Generally speaking, if two or more persons engage in a common
or joint enterprise, or other agency relationship, in which they use
and occupy a motor vehicle driven by one of their number, but in
the management of which all have equal authority and rights, each
assumes responsibility for the conduct of the one who is doing the
driving and each occupant is chargeable with the driver's negligence.1
This generality is an overstatement, however, for many courts say
that it does not apply to the minor.2
The scope of this paper is to examine the reasons which induced
courts to make a distinction between the infant and adult in this
area of the law and to examine the trend of recent court decisions.
It is assumed, for the purposes of this note, that a minor is engaged
in a common or joint enterprise or other agency relationship, with
the driver of a car which is involved in an accident, that the agent
driver was negligent, and that the minor is either suing or being
sued for injuries received as a result of the accident.
Early courts held that the infants contracts were voidable in
most situations, but when they were confronted with an attempt
by a minor to appoint another to act for him in the business world
they held the relationship void.3 In support of this position it has
been reasoned that if the acts done by the agent for the minor are
voidable at the minor's pleasure, then the power of attorney is not
operative according to its terms; whereas if the acts of the agent
0 Pilpel. "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 83 Taxes
271, 276 (1955).
1 2 Harper & James, Torts § 2613 (1956); Cf. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103
Conn. 583, 131 AUt. 432 (1925).2 Palmer v. Miller, 380 I1. 256, 43 N.E. 2d 973 (1942); Hodge v. Feiner,
338 Mo. 268, 90 S.W. 2d 90 (1935).
3 Ibid.
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